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1. Introduction 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, emerging market countries embraced growing financial 
liberalization and openness. However, by also trying to maintain some degree of both exchange 
rate stability and monetary independence, many of these countries experienced severe financial 
crises. In the aftermath of these crises, many emerging markets have adopted a policy 
configuration involving greater, though still managed, exchange rate flexibility, together with 
ongoing financial integration and some degree of domestic monetary independence. Hoarding of 
international reserves has become a key ingredient enhancing the stability of this new pattern.  
Concerns about the cost of maintaining monetary stability with this new policy mix suggest the 
need to support hoarding international reserves with more aggressive sterilization.  
Apprehensions about the opportunity costs of accumulating reserves and the fiscal and 
distortionary financial costs of sterilization, in turn, have raised questions about the long-run 
viability of this new policy mix, particularly the efficacy of sterilization.  
In this paper we evaluate these considerations by estimating the marginal propensity to 
sterilize foreign asset accumulation over time for selected countries in Asia and Latin America. 
Our results confirm that the greater accumulation of foreign reserves in recent years has been 
associated with a greater intensity of sterilization by developing countries in Asia as well as in 
Latin America. In particular, we show that there has been a significant increase in the coefficient 
of sterilization in recent years. Thus the policies of hoarding international reserves and sterilizing 
the potential inflationary impact have complemented each other during recent years. In addition, 
we find that sterilization of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows typically is less than that for 
current account surpluses and for non-FDI inflows, suggesting that misgivings about monetary 
instability depend on the composition of balance of payments inflows. 
We also discuss the benefits and costs of sterilization. For many countries the costs of 
sterilization appear to be below the perceived benefits associated with monetary stability and 
reserve accumulation. However, we also present evidence suggesting that relative benefits to 
China and other countries have fallen in recent quarters. This implies limits to the sustainability 
of the new policy configuration in the near term.  
Finally, we outline a model explaining how the ability to sterilize depends on imperfect 
substitutability of assets in a world where the costs of trading assets varies systematically across 
agents (due to possible scale effects) and across asset classes (due to varying liquidity and risk 
characteristics). 
2. The Trilemma     3
A major lesson of the past decade or so has been the downside risk of combining 
international financial integration with soft exchange rate pegs. Each of the major international 
financial market-related crises since 1994 -- Mexico, in 1994, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea in 
1997, Russia and Brazil in 1998, and Argentina and Turkey in 2000—has in some way involved 
a fixed or pegged exchange rate regime. At the same time, countries that did not have pegged 
rates—among them, Israel, Mexico, and South Africa in 1998—avoided crises of the type that 
afflicted emerging market countries with pegged rates.
1 As a result, more emerging market 
countries have adopted a policy mix of managed exchange rates, while still trying to maintain 
some degree of domestic monetary control together with growing financial integration. They 
have accomplished this with a policy combination of massive reserve hoarding and sterilization.  
A useful perspective for understanding the changing configuration of monetary policy by 
developing countries is provided by applying the framework of the impossible trinity dilemma – 
the Trilemma. The Trilemma states that a country simultaneously may choose any two, but not 
all, of the following three goals: monetary independence, exchange rate stability and financial 
integration (see Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor, 2005 for further discussion and references 
dealing with the Trilemma).   
Figure 1a illustrates the Trilemma problem. In terms of the triangle depicted in the figure, 
each of the three sides -- monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial 
integration -- has an attraction, but it is not possible to be simultaneously on all three sides of the 
triangle and thus attain all three goals. At the top vertex – labeled “closed capital markets” -- a 
country can have monetary policy control and a fixed exchange rate, but not financial 
integration.  This was the preferred policy choice of most developing countries in the mid to late 
1980s, as they maintained a combination of exchange rate stability and monetary independence, 
with relatively closed capital accounts.  
As depicted in Figure 1b, in the late 1980s and early 1990s countries such as Mexico, 
Korea, and several other Asian economies, embraced growing financial liberalization and 
openness. However, as they opened more financially, they found that the goals of greater 
financial integration, exchange rate stability, and monetary independence were simultaneously 
unattainable. The inconsistent policy goals resulted in severe financial crises, in Mexico during 
                                                 
1 This message has been communicated in well-known papers by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Fischer 
(2001). Related papers have raised the possibility that a pegged exchange rate can create a “trap” in an era 
of greater financial integration, whereby the regime initially confers gains in anti-inflation credibility, but 
ultimately results in an exit from the peg occasioned by a big enough adverse real shock that creates large 
welfare losses to the economy  (see Eichengreen, 2001; Frankel, 1999; Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 2005; 
Aizenman and Glick, 2008).   4
1994-95 and in East Asia during 1997-98.
2 These crises confirmed the tradeoffs associated with 
the Trilemma: a country opting for greater financial integration must give up exchange rate 
stability if it wishes to preserve a degree of monetary independence.  Failure to do so induced 
crises, after which Mexico, Korea, and other countries opted for a new policy configuration 
associated with moving downwards within the Trilemma triangle.  The emerging Trilemma 
configuration seems to involve greater financial integration and greater managed exchange rate 
flexibility, trading off exchange rate stability with capital mobility while maintaining some 
degree of monetary independence.
 3  In the early 1990s, Argentina adopted another Trilemma 
configuration corresponding to the vertex labeled “hard peg,” involving exchange rate fixity, 
supported by a version of a currency board, and complete financial integration.  Argentina also 
experienced a crisis in the early 2000s when ceding monetary policy independence became no 
longer viable. 
Post crisis, more emerging markets have opted for a policy configuration involving more 
exchange rate flexibility, ,   domestic monetary independence, and growing financial integration. .   
But they are still engaging in a great degree of exchange rate management. So, in the face of 
pressures for their currencies to appreciate, they have been accumulating reserves and sterilizing.  
China vividly displays this policy mix, allowing greater de-facto financial integration, and in 
mid-2005 adopting managed exchange rate flexibility, while also accumulating and sterilizing 
massive amounts of foreign reserve inflows.  
Econometric analysis suggests structural shifts in the pattern of reserve hoarding by 
developing countries (see Aizenman and Marion, 2003; Aizenman and Lee, 2008, and Cheung 
and Ito, 2007). One shift occurred in the early 1990s, as reflected in rising foreign reserve/GDP 
ratios, a trend that intensified shortly after the East Asian crisis of 1997-8, but subsided by 2000.  
A second structural shift seems to have taken place in the early 2000s, driven largely by the 
unprecedented increase in hoarding of foreign reserves by China. 
This massive foreign reserve accumulation may be attributed to several factors. First, 
some countries have acquired reserves to satisfy precautionary demand needs. Reserves provide 
                                                 
2 The list of countries with similar experiences is much longer (e.g., Russia, Brazil, and others). Our 
reference here to Mexico and East Asia is mostly due to the timing of their crises, each being the first in 
its respective region to experience a “sudden stop” episode, triggered by the sharp reversal of short-term 
financial flows (“hot money”).  
3 Note that exchange rate stability may remain a desirable policy goal. A heavily managed float allows 
countries to stabilize their exchange rate, while retaining the option of exchange rate adjustment in the 
presence of large shocks without undergoing a balance of payment crisis. Similarly, countries may opt for 
a stable exchange rate, though at the cost of less monetary independence (see the experiences of Estonia, 
Hong Kong, and other countries).  Hence, in line with the Trilemma, the trend towards greater financial 
integration by developing countries implies that countries must trade off the benefits of financial 
integration against the costs of reduced monetary autonomy and/or more flexible exchange rates.             5
self insurance against sudden stops of foreign capital inflows, thereby offsetting the downside 
risk of greater financial integration.
 Secondly, reserves  may be used to cushion the effects of 
terms of trade shocks on a country’s real exchange rate and its exports, smoothing the adjustment 
of the current account. In addition, they allow countries to avoid relying on the IMF, World 
Bank, and other international financial organizations, etc. for implicit insurance. Lastly, reserve 
accumulation may occur as a byproduct of managing exchange rates to promote exports by 
undervaluing domestic currency.
4   
 
3. Reserve Accumulation and Sterilization Response  
Reserve accumulation has monetary implications. When a central bank purchases foreign 
reserve assets, it must decide whether to fund it by increasing the reserve money base, which is 
potentially inflationary, or by reducing its net domestic assets, which sterilizes the impact on the 
domestic reserve money base.  Central banks may offset the effects of reserve accumulation on 
the monetary base in a number of ways, including selling market instruments, such as 
government bonds or central bank bills or by using swaps or repurchase operations.  With 
foreign exchange swaps, the central bank typically agrees to buy foreign exchange forward, 
while with repurchase operations (“repos”) the central bank sells securities with an agreement to 
buy them back in the future. When markets are thin, some authorities rely on non-market 
instruments, such as transferring the deposits of government and public financial institutions 
from the commercial banking system to the central bank or selling foreign exchange reserves to 





Some Plots  
Figure 2 plots 4-quarter changes in central bank net foreign reserve assets (FR) and in net 
domestic credit assets (DC), each scaled by the reserve money stock (RM) at the end of the 
period four quarters earlier, for selected Asian countries.
6 Net foreign reserves are defined by 
taking the dollar-denominated level of foreign reserves and adjusting them for exchange rate 
                                                 
4 For these reasons, even countries that maintained fixed exchange rates, such as China until mid-2005, 
opted to support their pegs by accumulating sizable amounts of foreign reserves. 
5 Monetary authorities also may seek to sterilize the effects of reserve inflows, not just on the reserve 
money base, but also on the broader money supply by, for example, increasing compulsory reserve 
requirements on bank deposits. China, for example, has raised reserve requirements significantly in recent 
years. 
6 Using four-quarter changes helps to smooth the data by eliminating much of the quarter to quarter noise.   6
changes, to give a valuation-adjusted measure of changes in net foreign reserves  in domestic 
currency.
7  Net domestic credit assets (DC) are defined as the reserve monetary base (RM) minus 
net foreign reserves (FR). Positive values of net foreign reserve accumulation by the central bank 
correspond to foreign reserve inflows. Negative values of net domestic credit correspond to 
reductions in domestic assets held by the monetary authorities.    
In the case of China, the extent of sterilization was relatively limited until the early 
2000s, as the monetary impact of reserve inflows (i.e. positive levels of  / FRR M Δ ) was generally 
augmented by monetary stimulus from central bank acquisition of domestic assets (i.e. positive 
levels of / DC RM Δ  .
8 Since mid-2002, however, as China experienced sharply rising foreign 
reserve inflows, these inflows were accompanied by negative changes in domestic asset holdings 
by the central bank, primarily through sales of PBC bills, implying the reserve inflows were 
being sterilized. The increase in the extent of sterilization in the early 2000s implies a possible 
break from China’s prior sterilization behavior. 
Other countries in Asia also have experienced significant reserve inflows in the aftermath 
of the Asia crisis. In the case, of Korea, for example, reserve inflows increased in 1999 and 2000, 
subsided somewhat, and then rose again in the period 2002-2005 around the time China began 
accumulating reserves at a rising rate. Korea’s monetary authorities responded to the monetary 
impact of these inflows by sterilization.  A similar pattern of inflows and sterilization is apparent 
for other countries in Asia, particularly in Thailand, Malaysia, and India. 
For comparison, we also show results for selected Latin American countries -- Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico.
9  In the case of Argentina, modest reserve inflows emerged in 2003 in the 
aftermath of the country’s financial crisis of 2001-02; however, these inflows were not evidently 
sterilized until the latter half of 2004 when changes in the domestic asset holdings of the central 
bank turned negative. In Brazil, reserve inflows began increasing in the latter half of 2004, 
accompanied by sterilization. A similar pattern of reserve inflows and offsetting declines in 
central bank domestic assets occurred in Mexico in 1996 in the aftermath of its 1994-95 peso 
crisis.  
 
                                                 
7 Specifically, we define ( ) ( ) /$ -1 1 ()$  -   $ --   tL C t t t t t FR S FR FR FL FL − Δ= , where FR$ denotes foreign 
reserves in dollars (IMF line 1l.d),  /$ LC S  is the local currency price of the dollar ,  FL denotes financial 
liabilities of the central bank (IMF line 16c), , and "Δ " is the change operator.  Accordingly, we define 
DC RM FR Δ= Δ− Δ .  
8 The exception is the period 1993 when China sterilized the effects of foreign reserve outflows by 
expanding the reserve money stock by increasing domestic asset holdings.  
9 The sample period for Argentina and Brazil begins 4 quarters after the implementation of their monetary 
reforms – 1992 Q1 for Argentina and 1995 Q2 for Brazil.   7
Estimation of Sterilization Response 
We now turn to quantitatively estimating changes in the degree of sterilization. Our 
specification is very simple. We estimate the extent of sterilization by a simple regression of the 
monetary authorities' change in net domestic assets on the change in net foreign assets, where 
change is measured over four quarters, and scaled by the level of the reserve money stock four 
quarters ago.  We also include the four-quarter growth rate of nominal GDP on the right-hand 
side to control for other explanatory variables, Z, that might influence the demand for money:
10 
44 // DC RM FR RM Z α β −− Δ= + Δ +       ( 1 )  
We estimate the sterilization coefficient,β , with OLS using 40-quarter rolling samples.
11 In 
these circumstances, a unitary coefficient, i.e.β = -1, on the variable   / FRR M Δ  represents full 
monetary sterilization of reserve changes, while β = 0 implies no sterilization. A value of the 
sterilization coefficient between these levels, -1 < β < 0, indicates partial sterilization.    
In our base specification Z is defined as the rate of nominal GDP growth.  Presuming a 
stable demand for money, a rudimentary version of the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments implies that expansion of DC by the central bank at the growth rate of GDP would 
meet the increase in the demand for money, without the need to hoard foreign reserves. Thus  
with full sterilization  (β = -1) the central bank allows domestic credit to accommodate fully 
higher demand for money due to GDP growth, but prevents any domestic credit expansion due to 
hoarding foreign reserves.  A value of sterilization less than -1 may represent tighter monetary 
policy, potentially due to greater concerns about inflation. In this case hoarding a unit of foreign 
reserves reduces domestic assets held by the central bank by more than one unit, thereby 
reducing the monetary base.  Similarly, a value of sterilization above zero may indicate 
expansionary monetary policy, potentially due to concerns about a credit crunch or exposure to a 
systemic crisis.
12 
The results are plotted in Figure 3.  Coefficient observations correspond to the calendar 
date of the 40
th quarter in each rolling sample.
13 
                                                 
10 We imputed quarterly GDP growth for some countries in our sample from a moving average of the 
prior year, current, and following year observations.  
11 We begin with the sample period 1984 Q2 to 1994 Q1, roll to 1984 Q3 – 1994 Q2, etc., ending with 
1997 Q3 - 2007 Q2, depending on data availability.  
12 Note that the sterilization coefficient is only one parameter determining the stance of monetary policy.  
Fuller understanding of monetary policy requires information about changes in private and public banks’ 
reserve requirements, discount window operations, etc. 
13 The figures report one standard error bands, using Newey-West errors adjusted for serial correlation of 
up to 3 quarters. Regression results for the full sample and tests of the null hypotheses that the 
sterilization coefficient differs from 0 or -1 are presented in tables below.    8
In the case of China, observe that the sterilization coefficient began rising (in absolute 
value) from roughly 0.6 in 2000, a trend that accelerated in the latter half of 2002 and continued 
into 2006 when it peaked at almost 1.5,  suggesting the presence of a break in behavior.
14 The 
plot also indicates a reversal of China’s sterilization behavior beginning in the fourth quarter of 
2006. This evident decline in China’s degree of sterilization can be attributed to two possibilities.  
First, China’s foreign reserve accumulation in recent periods may be overstated to the extent that 
the reported figures have not been adjusted to take account of swaps and shifts of foreign reserve 
assets to China’s nascent sovereign wealth fund.
15 Second, China may indeed have reached 
limits to the extent of its ability to sterilize its massive reserve inflows.  
 In Korea a break in sterilization behavior is evident after the financial crisis of 1997-98, 
with the sterilization coefficient increasing from 0.9 to more than 1.0 by 1999. Increases in 
sterilization, though to lesser extent, are observable in Thailand and Malaysia, while no change is 
evident in the case of Singapore. In the case of India, a modest increase in sterilization appears to 
have occurred in the mid 1990s after its financial crisis of 1991, followed by a further increase 
after 2002.   
For comparison we also present rolling regression results for our three Latin America 
countries. As before, the sample ranges are limited to the period after the stabilization of 
monetary policy in 1991 in Argentina and 1994 in Brazil; in both cases some increases in 
sterilization in observable over the period.
16 In the case of Mexico, sterilization increased 
modestly in 1996 and later around 2005.   
In the Appendix Figures, we examine the sensitivity of our results to alternative 
regression specifications. Specifically, we plot rolling regression coefficients based on (i) 
nonoverlapping quarterly observations of 1 quarter changes, and (ii) nonoverlapping annual 
                                                 
14 Central bank balance sheet data for China is available only from 1985 Q3, implying that the first 4-
quarter change observation begins in 1986 Q2, and the first 40-quarter rolling sample period is 1986 Q2 – 
1996 Q1.  
15 China’s sovereign wealth fund, the China Investment Corporation, was not formally established until 
the latter half of 2007 with an initial capitalization of $200 billion out of China’s total reserve holdings of 
more than $1.3 trillion. But there are indications of central bank asset shifts to its predecessor institution, 
Huijins Investment, and to some Chinese commercial banks before then. Netting these amounts against 
reported foreign reserve holdings would reduce the magnitude of foreign reserve inflows and raise the 
implied level of central bank domestic assets, resulting in a lower estimated degree of sterilization.   
16 For Argentina, monetary policy was initially stabilized with the adoption of its currency board in 1991 
Q1, implying that the first 4-quarter change observation begins in 1992 Q1, and the first 40-quarter rolling 
sample period is 1992 Q1 – 2001 Q4. For Brazil, the first 40-quarter rolling sample is 1995 Q2 - 2005 Q1.   9
observations of 4 quarter changes.
17  Our general finding that sterilization has increased appears 
reasonably robust.
18  
Formal regressions assessing the significance of breaks in sterilization behavior are 
reported in Table 1. There we estimate equation (1) for the full sample period by also including a 
term interacting  / FRR M Δ with a dummy variable DumBreak, defined with a value of unity for 
all periods beginning with each country’s designated break date.  We identified break dates for 
each country by the first observation after the 1997-98 Asia crisis (after the 1994-95 peso crisis 
in the case of Mexico) in which reserve inflows were positive and net domestic assets were 
reduced for at least two quarters in a row.
19  A variant regression, reported in column (3), 
controls separately for sterilization behavior during a country’s most recent period of significant 
foreign reserve outflows, denoted by DumCrisis. We report both Huber-White standard errors (in 
parentheses) and Newey-West standard errors (in square brackets). The Newey-West errors 
adjust for serial correlation of up to three quarters, a possible concern because of our use of 
overlapping quarterly observations of 4 quarter changes.
20  The break date and crisis periods for 
each country are reported in Table 1. Our methodology identifies a break date of 2002 Q2 for 
China, 1998 Q4 for Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, and 2000 Q4 for India. The break 
dates for Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are 2004 Q3, 2003 Q3, and 1996 Q4, respectively.   
Observe that the coefficients on the net foreign reserve inflow variable and on the 
interactive term are always negative for all countries, implying the inflows were sterilized by  
reduction of central bank domestic assets and that this sterilization increased (i.e., the change in 
domestic asset holdings is more negative) after the break date.  The coefficient on the interaction 
term is significant in the cases of China, Korea, and India, as well as in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Mexico.  This supports the observation drawn from the rolling regression plots that sterilization 
behavior has intensified in recent years for emerging countries in Asia as well as in Latin 
                                                 
17 In the first specification we also include a lagged dependent variable as well as 3 quarterly dummies as 
explanatory variables. See Mohanty and Turner (2006) who employ a similar specification; also see Glick 
and Hutchison (2003) who use an unconstrained vector error correction approach to estimate sterilization 
dynamics. 
18 The results for Malaysia using nonoverlapping 4-quarter changes are an apparent exception.  
19 We are aware of the potential biases inherent in using prior knowledge to pick break dates. For this 
reason we deliberately avoided choosing break dates based on the inflection points of our rolling 
regression plots.  We do not feel that our general conclusions would be affected by use of more 
sophisticated time series approaches to identifying breaks.  
20 Recall that in our Appendix figures we plotted rolling regression coefficients based on samples of 
nonoverlapping quarterly and annual series observations. We do not use either of these samples in Table 1 
as the quarterly series introduces excessive noise into the data while the annual series is insufficiently 
long.  We prefer to use an overlapping sample of observations, while controlling for possible serial 
correlation through the use of appropriately adjusted standard errors.    10
America.
21 Also note that the coefficient on nominal GDP growth is positive, implying that the 
central bank supplies liquidity to the economy by increasing its claims in response to greater 
economic activity.
 22   
The rolling regressions suggest that sterilization increased in most countries in our 
sample after the Asia crisis or at the time that China began sterilizing significantly in 2002. To 
assess the extent to which countries are converging towards similar sterilization patterns, we 
make a cross-country comparison of sterilization behavior over time.  Figure 4 reports the 
coefficient of variation of the sterilization coefficients for countries in Asia and Latin America as 
well as the two regions pooled together. We augment the sample of countries: in Asia, to our 
original sample of China, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and India, we add Indonesia, 
Pakistan, and the Philippines; in Latin America, to our original sample of Argentina, Brazil, and 
Mexico, we add Chile, Colombia, and Peru.
23 Observe that the coefficient of variation declined 
substantially in Asia over the period 2000 – 2005, after which it began to rise somewhat.
24 In 
Latin America, the coefficient of variation fell, beginning in 2000.  These results suggest the 
timing of the increase in the extent of sterilization across countries may have a common 
component.  
 
Sterilization and Inflation  
Table 2 separates out the effects of inflation from real GDP changes on the central bank’s 
management of its domestic asset holdings. It also examines the extent to which the response to 
inflation has changed over time and whether any changes in this response has affected the 
sterilization of foreign reserve inflows. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 report the separate effects of inflation without and with 
real GDP as an explanatory variable. Observe that the coefficients on inflation and real GDP 
growth are generally positive and significant, consistent with the positive sign on nominal GDP 
                                                 
21 It should be noted that we report significance results based on two-tailed tests of the null that 
sterilization behavior has changed.  One-tailed tests of the null that sterilization behavior has increased 
(i.e., become more negative) would increase the significance of breaks.   
22It should be noted that we do not take account of possible simultaneity bias because net foreign reserve 
changes may respond to domestic monetary policy, particularly when the central bank intervenes and 
affects the exchange rate.  However, prior work seeking to control for the possible endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables in sterilization regressions through instrumental estimation has not found much 
effect on coefficient magnitudes and their standard errors as compared to OLS (e.g., Ouyang, Rajan, and 
Willett 2007).   
23 We only include Argentina and Brazil in the sample only ten years after the implementation of their 
monetary reforms, 2002 Q1 for Argentina and 2005 Q2 for Brazil. 
24 In addition to the decline in sterilization in recent quarters noted above in the case of China, 
sterilization in the Philippines has declined notably as well.   11
observed earlier (the exceptions are the negative coefficients on real GDP for Korea and 
Thailand, though they are not significant).  Note also that the magnitude of the coefficient of net 
foreign assets interacted with our break dummies are smaller (in absolute value) and in some 
cases less significant than those reported in Table 1.  Column (3) augments the regression in 
column (2) by including an interaction variable involving the inflation rate with the break date 
dummies. For several countries – notably Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Argentina, and 
Brazil -- the coefficient on this variable is negative, suggesting an increase in anti-inflation 
monetary management by the central bank in recent years (though the coefficient is not 
significant for Korea and Singapore). Note also that we still find an increase in the sterilization 
response in most countries, as indicated by a negative coefficient on the interactive variable with 
foreign reserve inflows (the exceptions are Malaysia, Argentina, and Brazil).
25 Thus, our result 
that developing countries have increased their degree of sterilization in recent years appears to be 
robust to allowing for any direct response to inflation pressures. 
 
Sterilization and the Composition of Balance of Payments Inflows  
Table 3 shows the evolution of current account balances, direct investment inflows, and 
other capital inflows, as well as reserve accumulation for emerging market countries as a whole, 
several regional groupings, and selected individual countries.  The figures reported are annual 
averages of flows for subperiods before and after recent major financial crises, specifically the 
Mexican crisis of 1994-95 and the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-99. 
Observe that the magnitude of reserve accumulation in Asia has steadily increased over 
time, consistent with our earlier observations based on central bank balance sheet data.
26 Observe 
also that in the most recent period, 2000-2006, these inflows primarily have reflected current 
account surpluses, rather than large capital inflows. This is the opposite of the pattern seen in the 
late 1980s and 1990s, when most regions of the world experienced current account deficits and 
large capital inflows. Observe also that average direct foreign investment inflows have risen 
steadily for all emerging market regions over time. In contrast, average portfolio and other 
                                                 
25 The increase in sterilization was significant for both Argentina and Brazil in Table 1, where we 
controlled for other determinants of domestic monetary policy with nominal GDP, but did not allow for 
any break in the response to this variable. Evidently, allowing a break in the response to inflation, as in 
column (3) in Table 3, soaks up the effect of a break in sterilization behavior. The result in Table 3 for 
Argentina is particularly problematic as the coefficient on the interactive term with reserve inflows is 
significant and positive; in this case the coefficient on the interactive inflation term is unusually large (in 
absolute value) as well as significant.  
26 Note that the figures reported here are changes expressed in dollar terms, as compared to changes in 
terms of local currency reported in earlier tables and charts.    12
capital inflows ceased or declined dramatically after the Asia and Russian crises for almost all 
emerging markets.
27  
Does the sterilization response to reserve inflows vary according to the source of inflows, 
i.e., does the extent to which the central bank manage its domestic asset holdings depend on 
whether reserve inflows are associated with “cold” money flows” like FDI, or “hot” money 
inflows associated with other components of the balance of payments? Table 4 reports the results 
of estimating the sterilization response of the central bank to whether reserve inflows come from 
current account surpluses, foreign direct investment inflows, or non-FDI capital inflows.
28 We 
also investigate whether these responses have varied at the same time as the break dates in 
sterilization behavior identified earlier.  Consistent with our prior regression analysis, we 
measure variables in 4 quarter change terms, scaled by the lagged reserve money stock.
29 
As shown in column (2) of Table 4, the sterilization response to foreign direct investment 
is lower (in absolute magnitude, i.e.  10 12 , β ββ β << ) in several countries, including China, 
Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, as well as Brazil and Mexico (the latter in the case of 
the response relative to the current account). These differences are significant in China (relative 
to non-FDI inflows), Thailand (relative to the current account surplus), Malaysia, Singapore 
(relative to the current account), and Brazil.  Column (3) of Table 4 interacts the individual 
balance of payments components with our break date dummies to detect whether there is more or 
less sensitivity to these components in recent years. Consistent with our findings in Table 3, we 
find greater sensitivity (i.e. more negative coefficient values) in the cases of China, Thailand, 
Malaysia (though not to the current account balance in Malaysia), and India (though not in 
response to FDI flows, where the response fell significantly).  
Summarizing our empirical evidence on sterilization: The extent of sterilization of 
foreign reserve inflows has risen in recent years to varying degrees in Asia as well as in Latin 
America.  This is consistent with greater concerns about the potential inflationary impact of 
reserve inflows. Sterilization depends on the composition of balance of payments inflows, i.e., 
for some countries the response to foreign direct investment inflows is less than that to the 
                                                 
27 Hong Kong and Singapore had net portfolio outflows during 2000-06, offsetting the net capital inflows 
to other smaller East Asian countries, including Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. 
28  If the central bank is insensitive to any concerns about the relative magnitudes of different components 
of the balance of payments one would expect that the relevant regression coefficients would be 
insignificant.  The discussion about the risks of growing exposure to “hot money suggests that the central 
bank may indeed adjust its policies to reflect greater concern about “hot money” rather than about FDI 
flows. 
29 The quarterly data on dollar-denominated balance of payments flows are converted into local currency 
terms using the average local currency price of the dollar for each quarter.    13
current account surplus or non-FDI inflows.  This is consistent with the view that these countries 
are less concerned  about the monetary impact of direct investment flows. 
 
4. Costs, Benefits, and Sustainability of Sterilization Policy 
Growing financial integration is an unavoidable outcome of deeper trade integration by 
developing countries. A byproduct of growing financial integration is greater exposure to 
financial instability. Concerns about financial and monetary instability have increased the 
complementarily between the extent of reserve hoarding and sterilization: The extent to which 
individual countries may continue to accumulate reserves and sterilize and the stability of this 
policy mix depends on the associated benefits and costs.  
While providing useful services, international reserve management is subject to serious 
limitations.  First, there are direct opportunity costs of reserves associated with the marginal 
productivity of public capital and/or the cost of external borrowing. Second, sterilization has 
fiscal costs associated with the difference between, on the one hand, the return paid on central 
bank liabilities issued to sterilize domestic liquidity (or the opportunity cost from foregone 
returns on domestic assets, such as government bonds, sold to the private sector) and, on the 
other hand, the return earned on foreign reserve assets.    
Figure 5a plots a proxy for the fiscal costs of sterilization in the case of China, given by 
the difference between the 1-year People’s Bank of China and U.S. Treasury bill rates (the 
spread is the vertical difference between the two plotted lines).
 30   Observe that the interest rate 
spread was positive, but shrinking in 2003 and 2004, and actually turned negative in 2005, 
implying China then was earning money on balance from its sterilization operations. The 
narrowing of this differential in recent quarters (it actually turned positive again in December 
2007, however, implies that China’s sterilization costs have been rising.  Figure 5b plots change 
in interest rate spreads for five Asian countries between June 2004 and May 2007, showing that 
sterilization costs increased in all these countries.   
Sterilization and hoarding international reserves also involve macro and micro moral 
hazard costs. The macro moral hazard arises when reserve hoarding encourages opportunistic 
spending in regimes characterized by political instability and limited monitoring (see Aizenman 
and Marion (2004), who show that countries characterized by greater political instability and 
polarization opt to hold less international reserves). Micro moral hazard arises when reserve 
hoarding subsidizes risk taking. (Levy-Yeyati (2005) calls for liquid reserve requirement on 
                                                 
30 Note that this proxy ignores the adverse valuation effects from continued appreciation of the yuan and 
other Asian currencies.     14
banks, and an ex-ante suspension-of-convertibility clause.)  Lastly, reserve accumulation and 
sterilization can encourage financial sector distortions. For example, greater use of non-market 
instruments (e.g. reserve requirements, direct credit controls) can hinder the development of 
corporate bond market and alter the behavior of banks. Also it may hinder financial development 
by segmenting the public debt market through the issuance of central bank liabilities instead of 
Treasury securities.
31      
This discussion suggests that the extent to which a country may continue to sterilize 
depends also on the degree to which it is willing to tolerate financial repression and other 
distortions to its economy. In an Appendix we outline a model explaining how the ability to 
sterilize depends on imperfect substitutability of assets in a world where the costs of trading 
assets varies systematically across agents (due to possible scale effects) and across asset classes 
(due to varying liquidity and risk characteristics).  Within this framework we show that policies 
fostering greater domestic financial repression also reduce the costs of sterilization.  This 
suggests that countries able and willing to engage in greater financial sterilization will be able to 
sustain the policy configuration of reserve hoarding and sterilizing for a longer period of time.
32   
The stability of the current policy mix is further complicated by the extent to which each 
country’s cost-benefit calculation depends on the actions of other countries.  Countries following 
export-oriented growth strategies may choose to engage in competitive reserve accumulation to 
improve and maintain their competitiveness in exporting to industrial countries.  Thus, for 
example, as long as China and its East Asian neighbors are trying to maintain competitiveness in 
exporting to the United States, - and limits to sterilization. Those countries with lower costs of 
sterilization, due for example to greater willingness to distort their financial systems, might end 
up hoarding increasingly large amounts of international reserves, winning the hoarding game at 
least in the short run.  Arguably, this interpretation explains China’s unprecedented increase in 
foreign reserves from 2002, now amounting to almost 50 percent of GDP and well above the 
levels of other East Asia countries (see Aizenman and Lee, 2008).  Yet, this outcome may be 
fragile if it induces a country to accumulate to levels where the costs of sterilization exceed the 
benefit.
  These observations are consistent with the World Economic Outlook (2007), finding 
                                                 
31 Sterilization operations of in this form also have costs.  For example, reserve requirements act like a tax 
on banks which reduces financial intermediation and imposes a form of repression on the financial 
system.  
32 Our discussion points out that the costs of sterilization are the sum of direct opportunity costs and 
indirect costs associated with financial repression in the form of capital controls and higher reserve 
requirements imposed on the banking system.  As the focus of our paper is on the positive aspects of 
recent sterilization trends, we do not attempt to estimate the overall costs of sterilization.  Nevertheless, 
our discussion is consistent with the impact of changes in the direct opportunity costs of holding reserves 
on patterns of sterilization.  Further investigation of these issues is left for future research.   15
that resisting nominal exchange rate appreciation through sterilized intervention is likely to be 
ineffective when the influx of capital is persistent and large.  Indeed, China’s recently rising 
costs of sterilization may account for its recent decline in sterilization and increasing inflation 
rate.    16
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Table 1. Has Sterilization Increased in Magnitude Over Time?  
( ) ( )( ) 40 4 1 4 2 3 // / ( ) / l n ) DCR M F RR M F RR M D u m B r e a k F RR M D u m C r i s i s G N P αβ β β β −− − Δ= + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ  
 
Panel A. Selected Asian Countries 
 China  Korea  Thailand 
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
/ FRR M Δ   -0.782 -0.768 -0.827 -0.770 -0.833 -0.744 -0.931 -1.039 -0.929 
  (0.148)*** (0.096)*** (0.166)*** (0.039)*** (0.046)*** (0.038)*** (0.032)*** (0.034)*** (0.046)***
  [0.232]*** [0.138]*** [0.253]*** [0.049]*** [0.063]*** [0.041]*** [0.043]*** [0.037]*** [0.054]***
( )( ) / FRR M D u m B r e a k Δ   -0.345 -0.301 -0.256 -0.252 -0.132 -0.193 -0.099 -0.034 -0.044 
  (0.132)** (0.102)*** (0.146)*  (0.042)*** (0.057)** (0.047)***  (0.032)***  (0.044)  (0.043) 
  [0.199]* [0.151]**  -0.226  [0.056]*** [0.074]* [0.048]***  [0.044]**  [0.054]  [0.061] 
( )( ) / FR RM DumCrisis Δ     0.176 -0.219   -0.127
    (0.304)    (0.064)***    (0.053)** 
    [0.395]    [0.058]***    [0.059]** 
ln( ) GNP Δ     0.889 0.918   1.058 1.198   1.200 0.820 
   (0.088)*** (0.103)***  (0.324)*** (0.326)***   (0.262)*** (0.282)***
   [0.143]*** [0.162]***  [0.368]*** [0.400]***   [0.259]*** [0.320]** 
00 :1 H β =−   2.183 5.837**  1.083 34.299*** 13.181*** 44.776***  4.639**  1.319 2.431 
00 1 :1 H β β += −   2.194 1.046 1.223 0.55  1.226 3.892 0.839 0.024 0.659 
Adjusted R-squared  0.674 0.837 0.835 0.952 0.957 0.96  0.971 0.978 0.979 
Break date  2002 Q2  1998 Q4  1998 Q4 
Crisis period  1992 Q3 - 1993 Q3  1997 Q1 - 1998 Q3  1997 Q1-98 Q3 
Sample period  1986 Q2 - 2007 Q2  1985 Q1- 2007 Q2  1985 Q1-2007 Q2 
Observations  85 90 90 
 
Panel B. Other Selected Asian Countries 
 Malaysia  Singapore  India 
Explanatory Variable  (2) (3) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
/ FRR M Δ   -0.858 -0.880 -0.874 -0.935 -0.984 -0.993 -0.822 -0.805 -0.770 
  (0.140)*** (0.137)*** (0.152)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.024)*** (0.108)*** (0.090)*** (0.099)***
  [0.205]*** [0.200]*** [0.221]*** [0.021]*** [0.018]*** [0.024]*** [0.161]*** [0.115]*** [0.122]***
( )( ) / FRR M D u m B r e a k Δ   -0.193 -0.191 -0.196 -0.044 -0.018 -0.014 -0.208 -0.144 -0.169 
  (0.141) (0.142) (0.153) (0.011)*** (0.011) (0.013) (0.108)*  (0.087)*  (0.092)* 
  [0.21] [0.211]  [0.227]  [0.015]*** [0.015] [0.016] [0.165] [0.114] [0.116] 
( )( ) / FR RM DumCrisis Δ     -0.077    0.052    -0.363 
    (0.299)    (0.083)    (0.181)** 
    [0.326]    [0.054]    [0.215]* 
ln( ) GNP Δ     1.732 1.748   0.567 0.584   0.924 0.919 
   (0.416)*** (0.442)***  (0.120)*** (0.129)***   (0.152)*** (0.147)***
   [0.665]**  [0.708]**   [0.167]*** [0.173]***   [0.221]*** [0.210]***
00 :1 H β =−   1.036 0.761 0.689 12.596*** 0.767 0.083 2.722 4.744**  5.386*** 
00 1 :1 H β β += −   3.791*  8.940***  9.081***  1.888 0.006 0.182 0.837 2.606*  3.231* 
Adjusted R-squared  0.829 0.851 0.849 0.983 0.986 0.986 0.849 0.892 0.893 
Break date  1998 Q4  1998 Q4  2000 Q4 
Crisis period  1997 Q3 – 1998 Q3  1997 Q4 -1998 Q3  1990 Q4 - 1991 Q4 
Sample period  1985 Q1 -2007 Q2  1985 Q1- 2007 Q2  1985 Q1- 2006 Q4 
Observations  90 90 88   19
 
Table 1.  Has Sterilization Increased in Magnitude Over Time? (cont’d) 
 
Panel C. Selected Latin American Countries 
 Argentina  Brazil  Mexico 
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
/ FRR M Δ   -0.989 -1.006 -0.783 -0.861 -0.938 -0.569 -0.959 -0.975 -0.934 
  (0.033)*** (0.030)*** (0.089)*** (0.136)*** (0.135)*** (0.186)*** (0.027)*** (0.018)*** (0.036)***
  [0.034]*** [0.020]*** [0.092]*** [0.183]*** [0.188]*** [0.237]** [0.034]***  [0.022]*** [0.044]***
( )( ) / FRR M D u m B r e a k Δ   -0.019 -0.257 -0.282 -0.419 -0.284 -0.539 -0.233 -0.077 -0.103 
  (0.102) (0.123)**  (0.107)**  (0.183)**  (0.180) (0.217)**  (0.056)***  (0.038)**  (0.043)** 
  [0.168] [0.174] [0.165]*  [0.219]*  [0.246] [0.290]*  [0.092]**  [0.051] [0.057]* 
( )( ) / FR RM DumCrisis Δ     -0.262    -0.828    -0.071 
    (0.102)**    (0.246)***    (0.040)* 
    [0.105]**    [0.295]***    [0.050] 
ln( ) GNP Δ     1.272 0.936   0.138 0.131   0.394 0.399 
   (0.352)*** (0.310)***  (0.021)*** (0.025)***   (0.057)*** (0.061)***
   [0.412]*** [0.335]***  [0.025]*** [0.027]***   [0.075]*** [0.078]***
00 :1 H β =−   0.103 0.047 5.756**  1.045 0.213 5.402**  2.36  1.826 3.45* 
00 1 :1 H β β += −   0.175 5.820**  0.653 4.957**  3.386 0.956 17.411***  2.518 1.097 
Adjusted R-squared  0.949 0.968 0.972 0.591 0.64  0.683 0.958 0.979 0.98 
Break date   2004  Q3     2003 Q3      1996 Q4   
Crisis period  2000 Q4 – 2003 Q1  1998 Q3 -1999 Q4  1994 Q2 - 1995 Q4 
Sample period  1992 Q1 -2007 Q2  1995 Q2 - 2007 Q2  1985 Q1- 2007 Q2 
Observations  62 49 90 
 
Note: The table reports coefficients of  regressing central bank net domestic credit on net foreign reserves, measured as 4-
quarter changes, scaled by the lagged reserve money stock (RM).   ln( ) GNP Δ  is the 4 quarter percent change in nominal 
GDP, DumBreak is a dummy variable denoting break point in sterilization behavior, and  DumCrisis is a dummy variable 
denoting the most recent period of significant reserve outflows.  Huber-White standard errors in parentheses; Newey-West 
standard errors adjusted for serial correlation up to three quarters in square brackets.   F statistic for null hypothesis tests. 




   20
 
Table 2. Does Sterilization Depend on Inflation?  
( ) 40 4 1 4 2 3 4 / / / ( ) ln( ) ln( )( ) ln( ) DC RM FR RM FR RM DumBreak INFL INFL DumBreak RGNP αβ β β β β −− − Δ= + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ 
 
Panel A. Selected Asian Countries 
 China  Korea      Thailand 
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
/ FRR M Δ   -0.786 -0.778 -0.778 -0.767 -0.758 -0.760 -0.925 -0.930 -0.936 
  (0.130)*** (0.122)***(0.123)***(0.035)***(0.038)***(0.039)*** (0.031)***(0.030)***(0.029)***
  [0.114]*** [0.116]***[0.117]***[0.038]***[0.039]***[0.040]*** [0.019]***[0.019]***[0.019]***
( )( ) / FRR M D u m B r e a k Δ   -0.176 -0.191 -0.214 -0.216 -0.223 -0.215 -0.069 -0.066 -0.030 
  (0.126) (0.117) (0.123)*  (0.045)***(0.046)***(0.052)*** (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.044) 
  [0.115] [0.119] [0.143] [0.045]***[0.046]***[0.053]*** [0.038]*  [0.038]*  [0.038] 
ln( ) INFL Δ   0.816 0.795 0.791 1.79  1.631 1.644 1.051 1.145 1.176 
  (0.117)*** (0.108)***(0.109)***(0.705)**  (0.717)** (0.711)** (0.644)  (0.684)*  (0.719) 
  [0.107]*** [0.116]***[0.118]***[0.678]***[0.678]***[0.703]** [0.454]** [0.465]** [0.446]***
( ) ln( ) INFL DumBreak Δ     0.350    -0.324    -1.687 
    (0.597)    (1.057)    (0.604)***
    [1.150]    [1.116]    [0.577]***
ln( ) RGNP Δ    0.180  0.181   -0.813  -0.741   -0.385  -0.240 
   (0.453)  (0.455)   (0.685)  (0.711)   (0.38)  (0.389) 
   [0.383]  [0.385]   [0.837]  [0.878]   [0.403] [0.389] 
00 :1 H β =−   2.710*  3.314*  3.274*  45.496*** 39.8*** 38.146***  5.946** 5.345** 4.712** 
00 1 :1 H β β += −    0.264 0.188 0.009 0.241 0.295 0.433 0.019 0.011 0.898 
Adjusted R-squared  0.804 0.802 0.799 0.955 0.955 0.954 0.972 0.972 0.975 
Break date  2002 Q2  1998 Q4  1998 Q4 
Sample period  1987 Q1 – 2007 Q2  1985 Q1 - 2007Q2  1985 Q1 - 2007Q2 
Observations  82 90 90 
 
Panel B. Other Selected Asian Countries 
 Malaysia    Singapore  India 
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
/ FRR M Δ   -0.861 -0.930 -0.961 -0.959 -0.977 -0.978 -0.816 -0.751 -0.733 
  (0.135)*** (0.141)***(0.137)***(0.019)*** (0.020)***(0.018)*** (0.102)***(0.086)***(0.087)***
  [0.082]*** [0.084]***[0.080]***[0.018]*** [0.019]***[0.020]*** [0.080]***[0.071]***[0.071]***
( )( ) / FRR M D u m B r e a k Δ   -0.183 -0.082 0.039  -0.025 -0.022 -0.021 -0.152 -0.200 -0.314 
  (0.134) (0.147) (0.138) (0.014)*  (0.013)* (0.019)  (0.098)  (0.081)**  (0.098)***
  [0.091]**  [0.097] [0.099] [0.019] [0.018] [0.023] [0.088]*  [0.078]**  [0.101]***
ln( ) INFL Δ   2.719 4.623 5.152 1.274 0.534 0.562 0.462 0.422 0.486 
  (2.438) (1.795)**  (1.690)***(0.620)**  (0.673) (0.497) (0.214)**  (0.169)**  (0.171)***
  [1.875] [1.975]**  [1.875]***[0.606]**  [0.640] [0.739] [0.220]**  [0.194]**  [0.195]** 
( ) ln( ) INFL DumBreak Δ     -7.55    -0.104    0.854 
    (2.551)***  (1.995)    (0.445)* 
    [2.280]***  [1.313]    [0.492]* 
ln( ) RGNP Δ     2.395 1.783   0.691 0.688   0.596 0.629 
   (1.029)**  (1.168)   (0.225)***(0.229)***   (0.098)***(0.108)***
   [0.961]**  [0.928]*   [0.246]***[0.250]***   [0.119]***[0.119]***
00 :1 H β =−   1.049 0.244 0.083 4.518**  1.281 1.476 3.266 8.403***  9.423***   21
00 1 :1 H β β += −    3.406*  0.175 5.859**  1.256 0.001 0.003 0.545 1.397 0.696 
Adjusted R-squared  0.831 0.840 0.857 0.984 0.985 0.985 0.855 0.888 0.890 
Break date  1998 Q4  1998 Q4  2000 Q4 
Sample period  1985 Q1 - 2007Q2  1985 Q1 – 2007 Q2  1985 Q1 – 2006 Q4 
Observations  90 90 88 
 
Panel C. Selected Latin American Countries 
 Argentina  Brazil  Mexico 
 Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
/ FRR M Δ   -0.956 -1.032 -1.04  -0.932 -0.69  -0.736 -0.975 -0.975 -0.976 
  (0.040)*** (0.054)*** (0.055)*** (0.164)*** (0.165)*** (0.171)*** (0.019)***(0.019)*** (0.019)***
  [0.026]*** [0.042]*** [0.041]*** [0.167]*** [0.167]*** [0.164]*** [0.017]***[0.017]*** [0.016]***
( )( ) / FRR M D u m B r e a k Δ   -0.145 -0.262 0.837  -0.285 -0.130 0.044  -0.067 -0.059 -0.174 
  (0.097)  (0.113)** (0.345)** (0.246)  (0.216) (0.227) (0.040)*  (0.050) (0.063)***
  [0.125] [0.131]*  [-0.679]  [0.281] [0.258] [0.268] [0.048] [0.050] [0.064]***
ln( ) INFL Δ   1.713 1.377 1.352 0.603 1.077 1.017 0.561 0.566 0.582 
  (0.275)*** (0.334)*** (0.338)*** (0.875)  (0.904) -0.838) (0.079)***(0.081)*** (0.081)***
  [0.329]*** [0.350]*** [0.345]*** [0.524]  [0.494]** [0.481]** [0.055]***[0.056]*** [0.054]***
( ) ln( ) INFL DumBreak Δ     -7.488    -2.448    0.862 
    (2.415)***   (0.937)**    (0.399)** 
    [4.540]    [1.309]*    [0.313]***
ln( ) RGNP Δ     2.184 2.434   -13.796  -11.265    0.208 0.456 
    (1.031)** (1.052)**   (3.838)*** (4.258)**   (0.488)  (0.448) 
    [0.958]** [0.956]**   [4.124]*** [4.233]**   [0.368]  [0.365] 
00 :1 H β =−   1.201 0.343 0.534 0.172 3.525 2.398 1.677 1.785 1.594 
00 1 :1 H β β += −    1.366  5.071** 5.570** 2.152  1.857  4.740*  1.471  0.567  6.293** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.965 0.967 0.968 0.593 0.669 0.686 0.981 0.980 0.982 
Breakdate  2004 Q3  2003 Q3  1996 Q4 
Sample period  1992 Q1 – 2007 Q2  1995 Q2 – 2007 Q2  1985 Q1 – 2007 Q2 
Observations  62 49 90 
 
Note: The table reports coefficients of regressing central bank net domestic credit on foreign reserves, measured as 4 
quarter changes, scaled by lagged reserve money stock (RM).   ln( ) INFL Δ  is the 4 quarter percent change in the CPI,  
ln( ) RGNP Δ  is the 4 quarter change in real GDP, and  DumBreak is a dummy variable denoting break point in 
sterilization behavior.  Constant not reported. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses; Newey-West standard errors 
adjusted for serial correlation up to three quarters in square brackets.  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% indicated by ***, 
**, and *, respectively. 
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Table 3. Balance of Payments Inflows to Emerging Markets, Annual Averages, in billions U.S.$ 
 
 
Current Account  
Balance 
Net Foreign 
 Direct Investment 
Net non-Foreign 

































  Asia  7 -3  -26  206  5 18  49  81 9 20  53  -34  18  28  49  250 
     China  -5 5 4  100  2 9  36  58  5 0 3  -8  1 6  27  152 
     India  -6  -4  -6  -1  0 0 2  5 5 5 6  14  -1 2 0  20 
     Korea  7  -3 -16  14 0  0  -2 1 -4  5  23  10 3  1  4 25 
     Taiwan  13 10  8 24 -2  -2  -2 -4  0  -5  -7  2 11  2  -1 24 
     Other Asia  -2  -10  -17  69  4 11  15  20 2 16  28  -52  5 17  19  29 
   Latin America  -7 -21  -34 6  5  9  31  51  -19 25 22  -29  -1 18 24  20 
     Argentina  -2  -2  -6  4  1 2 5  4  -2 3 4  -11  0 3 2  1 
     Brazil  0 0  -21  -2  1 1 8  15  -11  0  24  -3  0 6  11  8 
     Mexico  -1 -18 -2  -12 2  4  9 20 -3 20 -8 1  0  5  6  6 
     Other LA  -3  -1  -5 16 1  2  9 11 -3  2  2 -15 -1  5  5  6 
   Central Europe  -2 -3 -6  -20  0  2 10  19  -4 -2 7 7 0  3 11  6 
   Russia     9  64     2  1     -14  -5     4  46 
   Middle East  -5 -22 5 86 -1  1  -2 -1  3  26  4 -61  -3  -2  5 13 
 Total -6  -48  -52 342  9  30  90 151 -11  70  71 -122 14  47  92 335 
 
Notes:  Net non-foreign direct investment inflows include portfolio and other capital flows in the financial account.  
Other Asia includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Other Latin America 
includes Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Central Europe includes Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Middle  
East includes Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.. Blank cells indicate values less than $500 million. 
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Table 4. Does Sterilization Depend on the Composition of Balance of Payments Inflows?  
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Panel A. Selected Asian Countries 
Explanatory Variable 
China Korea      Thailand 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
/ k CA RM − ∑   -1.728 -1.416 -0.798 -0.881 -0.867 -0.887 -1.482 -1.434 -1.011 
  (0.160)*** (0.106)***(0.194)***(0.058)***(0.067)***(0.112)*** (0.186)***(0.204)***(0.309)***
  [0.274]*** [0.167]***[0.283]***[0.065]***[0.082]***[0.130]*** [0.287]***[0.306]***[0.451]** 
/ k NFDI RM − ∑   -0.173 -1.098 -0.924 -0.806 -0.759 -1.052 -0.963 -0.938 -0.744 
  (0.207) (0.251)***(0.246)***(0.326)**  (0.333)** (0.561)*  (0.221)***(0.216)***(0.266)***
  [0.361] [0.434]**  [0.401]**  [0.390]**  [0.398]* [0.762]  [0.354]***[0.338]***[0.390]* 
/ k non NFDI RM − − ∑   -0.572 -1.606 -0.931 -1.052 -1.037 -1.087 -1.260 -1.188 -0.937 
  (0.228)** (0.207)*** (0.321)***(0.074)***(0.088)*** (0.144)*** (0.121)***(0.150)***(0.220)***
  [0.393] [0.311]*** [0.522]*  [0.103]***[0.129]*** [0.196]*** [0.179]***[0.209]***[0.306]***
ln( ) GNP Δ    1.241  1.121   0.510  0.693   -0.860  -2.340 
   (0.155)***(0.184)*** (0.607) (0.617)   (0.683) (0.998)** 
   [0.240]***[0.285]*** [0.863] [0.866]   [1.017] [1.426] 
() () / k CA RM DumBreak − ∑     -0.438    0.004    -1.216 
    (0.239)*    (0.106)    (0.472)** 
    [0.321]    [0.117]    [0.670]* 
( )( ) / k FDI RM DumBreak − ∑     -0.859    0.335    -0.359 
    (0.319)***  (0.734)    (0.269) 
    [0.414]**    [0.983]    [0.369] 
() () / k non FDI RM DumBreak − − ∑     -0.329    0.185    -0.655 
    (0.487)    (0.162)    (0.302)** 
    [0.594]    [0.208]    [0.403] 
01 0 : H β β <   28.538*** 1.129  >   0.043  0.087  >  2.918**  2.614*  1.035 
''
011 0 0 : H β ββ β +<+     >    0.134    10.471***
01 2 : H β β <    2.097*  5.372**  0.001 0.459 0.562 0.004 1.577 1.001 0.835 
''
011 2 2 : H β ββ β +<+     >    0.001    3.445** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.558 0.742 0.787 0.837 0.837 0.835 0.743 0.743 0.773 
Break date  2002 Q2  1998 Q4  1998 Q4 
Sample period  1986 Q2 – 2006 Q2  1985 Q1 -  2007 Q2  1985 Q1– 2007 Q1 












Table 4. Does Sterilization Depend on the Composition of Balance of Payments Inflows? (cont’d) 
 
Panel B. Other Selected Asian Countries 
 Malaysia    Singapore  India 
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
/ k CA RM − ∑   -0.968 -0.973 -1.060 -1.120 -0.872 -0.807 -1.152 -1.109 -0.799 
  (0.065)*** (0.077)***(0.350)***(0.184)*** (0.191)***(0.342)** (0.056)***(0.058)***(0.114)***
  [0.094]*** [0.117]***[0.434]**  [0.230]*** [0.236]***[0.390]** [0.080]***[0.084]***[0.122]***
/ k NFDI RM − ∑   -0.227 -0.268 -0.131 -0.882 -0.510 -0.985 -1.531 -1.332 -1.856 
  (0.268) (0.352) (0.444) (0.174)*** (0.186)***(0.354)*** (0.226)***(0.241)***(0.260)***
  [0.397] [0.543] [0.682] [0.189]*** [0.222]** [0.378]** [0.267]***[0.275]***[0.324]***
/ k non NFDI RM − − ∑   -1.139 -1.137 -1.092 -0.837 -0.532 -0.897 -0.721 -0.796 -0.742 
  (0.071)*** (0.073)***(0.467)**  (0.153)*** (0.184)***(0.339)** (0.100)***(0.096)*** (0.152)***
  [0.088]*** [0.091]***[0.562]*  [0.154]*** [0.223]** [0.294]***  [0.119]***[0.108]*** [0.170]***
ln( ) GNP Δ     0.183 0.020   -3.585  -3.598    0.420 0.458 
   (0.683)  (0.998)**   (1.463)**  (1.769)**   (0.125)***(0.129)***
    [1.225] [1.789]   [1.926]*  [2.469]   [0.150]***[0.144]***
() () / k CA RM DumBreak − ∑       0.260     0.031     -0.581 
      (0.388)     (0.296)     (0.161)***
      [0.459]     [0.213]     [0.177]***
( )( ) / k FDI RM DumBreak − ∑     -1.461    0.568    0.787 
    (0.546)***  (0.389)    (0.384)** 
    [0.823]*    [0.354]    [0.344]** 
() () / k non FDI RM DumBreak − − ∑     -0.118    0.421    -0.340 
      (0.497)     (0.361)     (0.141)** 
    [0.602]    [0.234]*    [0.134]** 
01 0 : H β β <   10.355*** 5.819***  3.134**  >  2.698*  >  >  >  > 
''
011 0 0 : H β ββ β +<+    2.839**    1.891*    0.413 
01 2 : H β β <    10.929*** 5.659***  1.705*  0.105  0.030  >  >  >  > 
''
011 2 2 : H β ββ β +<+    0.691    0.112     0.001 
Adjusted R-squared  0.627 0.623 0.635 0.508 0.528 0.548 0.892 0.897 0.912 
Break date  1998 Q4  1998 Q4 2000 Q4 
Sample period  1985 Q1 – 2006 Q4  1995 Q4 – 2006 Q4  1985 Q1 – 2006 Q4 
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Table 4. Does Sterilization Depend on the Composition of Balance of Payments Inflows? (cont’d) 
 
Panel C. Selected Latin American Countries 
 Argentina  Brazil  Mexico 
 C. Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
/ k CA RM − ∑   -1.590 -1.431 -1.765 -1.435 -1.386 -2.292 -0.928 -0.963 -0.858 
  (0.421)*** (0.452)*** (0.766)**  (0.165)*** (0.214)*** (0.439)*** (0.176)***(0.171)*** (0.275)***
  [0.570]*** [0.608]**  [1.030]*  [0.161]*** [0.241]*** [0.525]*** [0.218]***[0.212]*** [0.267]***
/ k NFDI RM − ∑   -1.565 -1.567 -1.779 -0.375 -0.270 -0.626 -0.885 -0.791 -0.430 
  (0.393)*** (0.396)*** (0.502)*** (0.395)  (0.501) (0.587) (0.168)***(0.183)*** (0.515) 
  [0.523]*** [0.524]*** [0.624]*** [0.357]  [0.515] [0.681] [0.219]***[0.233]*** [0.489] 
4
1 / k k non NFDI RM − = − ∑   -1.319 -1.265 -1.448 -0.887 -0.867 -1.133 -0.800 -0.786 -0.768 
  (0.287)*** (0.292)*** (0.426)*** (0.138)*** (0.154)*** (0.172)*** (0.115)***(0.116)*** (0.153)***
  [0.422]*** [0.429]*** [0.601]**  [0.166]*** [0.181]*** [0.197]*** [0.122]***[0.123]*** [0.139]***
ln( ) GNP Δ     -0.938 -0.747   0.021  -0.030   0.255  0.057 
    (0.564) (0.490)   (0.036) (0.043)   (0.204) (0.269) 
    [0.655] [0.587]   [0.043] [0.051]   [0.285] [0.347] 
() () / k CA RM DumBreak − ∑     2.070    3.110    0.083 
    (1.160)*    (0.648)***    (0.321) 
    [1.456]    [0.823]***    [0.296] 
( )( ) / k FDI RM DumBreak − ∑     -1.936    -0.280    -0.406 
    (1.405)    (0.693)    (0.544) 
    [1.430]    [0.723]    [0.481] 
() () / k DumBreak non FDI RM − − ∑    0.937    0.494    0.230 
    (0.480)*    (0.315)    (0.173) 
    [0.608]    [0.307]    [0.150] 
01 0 : H β β <   > > >  11.547*** 9.627***  27.678***  0.098  1.445  1.572 
''
011 0 0 : H β ββ β +<+     >     >      > 
01 2 : H β β <    > > >  2.078*  1.905*  1.123  > >  0.608 
''
011 2 2 : H β ββ β +<+     >     >     > 
Adjusted R-squared  0.508 0.508 0.53  0.67  0.663 0.724 0.685 0.687 0.699 
Break date  2004 Q3  2003 Q3  1996 Q4 
Sample period  1992 Q1 -  2007 Q1  1995 Q2 – 2006 Q4  1985 Q1 – 2007 Q2 
Observations  61 47 90 
 
 
Note: The table reports coefficients of regressing central bank net domestic credit on 4-quarter cumulative current 
account surplus (CA), net foreign direct investment inflows (NFDI), and non-NFDI capital inflows (non-NFDI) 
expressed in local currency terms, all scaled by the lagged reserve money stock (RM). ln( ) GNP Δ  is the 4 quarter 
percent change in nominal GDP, and DumBreak is a dummy variable denoting break point in sterilization behavior.  
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses; Newey-West standard errors adjusted for serial correlation up to three 
quarters in square brackets.  F statistic for null inequality hypotheses, with one-tail significance test results; results 
not reported when (the absolute value of the) coefficient on FDI inflows exceeds that on current account surplus or 
non-FDI inflows, as indicated by “>”.  Constant not reported.  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% indicated by ***, **, 
and *, respectively. 
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Figure 1a: The Trilemma Framework 
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Figure 1b: Unstable Trilemma Configurations  
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Note:  Argentina, Korea, and Mexico (and other countries) experienced financial crises in the 1990s as they 
became more integrated with global financial markets and converged to policy configurations involving 
greater exchange rate flexibility, reserve hoarding, and sterilization in the aftermath of their respective crises. 
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Figure 2. Net Foreign Reserve and Net Domestic Credit Changes of Central Bank,  
(4 quarter changes relative to stock of reserve money lagged 4Q, in percent) 
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Note: positive values correspond to foreign reserve inflows or domestic credit increases.  28
Figure 2. Net Foreign Reserves and Net Domestic Credit Changes of Central Bank,  
(4 quarter changes relative to stock of reserve money lagged 4Q, in percent) 
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Note: positive values correspond to foreign reserve inflows or domestic credit increases.   29
Figure 2. Net Foreign Reserves and Net Domestic Credit Changes of Central Bank 
(4 quarter changes relative to stock of reserve money lagged 4Q, in percent)  
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Note: positive values correspond to foreign reserve inflows or domestic asset increases.   30
Figures 3.  Sterilization Coefficients from 40-quarter Rolling Regressions 
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Figures 3. Sterilization Coefficients from 40-quarter Rolling Regressions 
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Figures 3.  Sterilization Coefficients from 40-quarter Rolling Regressions 
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Note: Plots report coefficient estimates from regression of change in central bank domestic credit on 
change in foreign reserves (defined as 4 quarter changes relative to stock of reserve money 
lagged 4 quarters) and nominal GDP growth (with one standard error bands). Coefficient 
observations correspond to calendar date of 40
th quarter of rolling sample period.  
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Note: Calculations based on coefficient estimates from regression of central bank net domestic credit 
on foreign reserve change and nominal GDP growth for countries in Asia (China, Indonesia, Korea,  
Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand) and Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru). Coefficient observations correspond to calendar date of 40
th quarter 
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Appendix Figures.  Sterilization Coefficients from Alternative Rolling Regressions 
 














































Appendix Figures.  Sterilization Coefficients from Alternative Rolling Regressions 
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Appendix Figures.  Sterilization Coefficients from Alternative Rolling Regressions 
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Note: Coefficient estimates from  regression of the change in central bank domestic credit assets on the change in net 
foreign reserves (scaled by lagged reserve money) and nominal GDP growth. Solid line corresponds to regressions using 
(nonoverlapping) quarterly observations of 1 quarter changes with lagged dependent variable and quarterly dummies as 
explanatory variables. Dots correspond to regressions using (nonoverlapping) yearly observations of 4 quarter changes 
(from Q2 of each year). Coefficient observations correspond to calendar date of 40
th quarter or 10
th year of rolling 
sample period.   38
Model Appendix  
This Appendix analyzes the costs of sterilization by formulating a model of the 
determinants of the substitutability between domestic and foreign bonds as characterized by the 
marginal increase in the interest rate differential associated with reducing the share of foreign 
bonds in private portfolios.   
We consider a country where agents face financial repression and uncertainty about 
domestic price inflation, currency depreciation, and tax rate on returns.  The real yield to 
domestic residents to holding domestic and foreign bonds (B, B*) are   
riπ =− ,                  ( A 1 )  
  ** * rie tπ =+ −− ,                   ( A 2 )  
where i, i* denote nominal interest returns, π  is the domestic inflation rate, e is the depreciation 
rate of domestic currency, and t* is the tax on returns to holding foreign assets, reflecting the 
realized costs of financial repression; π , e, and t* are all stochastic.  The tax rate t* reflects the 
de-facto degree of financial repression, which may include regulations inhibiting or penalizing 
the holding of foreign assets.   
We assume agents are risk averse, with mean variance preferences: 
[]
2 , ; (1 ) (1 ) (1 *) W UU E W Ws r s W r σ ⎡⎤ == + + − + ⎣⎦ .      (A3)   
The expected real yield differential can be solved as  
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,* * 22 2 2
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Hence, sterilized intervention that reduces the share of foreign assets in the private 
portfolio,
* / B W , increases the expected interest rate differential,  [ ] [ ] * E rE r − , by the degree of 
risk aversion times the variance of the real interest rate differential, 
2
* rr θσ − .   
The variables π , e, and t* are all stochastic. Specifically, we denote by 
' , kk a ε  the 
constant and the shock associated with variables k,    k = π, e, t*  as   
'' ;; ee ae a ππ π εε =+ =+  *
*'
t t taε = + .   
We further assume (i) expected domestic inflation and the depreciation rate are correlated, (ii) 
shocks are zero mean and may be correlated and (iii) there are two types of agents ( , il h = ), with 
differential costs of holding foreign assets potentially different degree of risk aversion, with the 
“favored” type il =  having a low t*, implying     39
( ) ** ;; * , , , ee i t t hl ae e a t c a i lhc c ππ πε ε ε =+ = + = + = >  
where  * [] [] []0 et EEE π ε εε === . 
Noting that  ** * rr ii t e −= −+− , it follows that  
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22 2 2 2 2
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εε ε ε ε
σ
σ ρσ σ
− =−          ( A 6 )  
We presume that the correlation between depreciation and the financial repression tax is positive, 
i.e. 
*, 0
te εε ρ > (see Giovannini and De Melo, 1993).  
Expression (A6) implies that a higher correlation between the exchange rate depreciation 
rate and financial repression tax reduces the cost of sterilization.  This effect is larger the greater 
is the extent of financial repression (i.e., the higher is c, and the greater is the share of agents 
facing higher c).  In the limiting case when the correlation approaches 1, it follows that  * te k ε ε ≅ , 




* 1 (1 )
e te rr i ck ε ρ σ σ − → ⎯⎯⎯→ − .           ( A 7 )  
Consequently, the ability to sterilize depends on imperfect substitutability of assets in a world where 
the costs of trading assets varies systematically across agents (due to possible scale effects) and 
across asset classes (due to varying liquidity and risk characteristics).  Policies fostering greater 
domestic financial repression also reduce the costs of sterilization.  This suggests that countries able 
and willing to engage in greater financial sterilization will be able to sustain the policy configuration 
of reserve hoarding and sterilizing for a longer period of time.   